Into the Land of Bones

Customer Reviews

• Good Read

  I love history but I hate reading all the dry material. I want to learn and be entertained at the same time. I also don't like the material to be so above my head that I have no idea what is going on the book. This book is great if you are like me and have trouble focusing reading, it manages to keep your attention. It also goes into great detail and makes you feel like you could possibly know Alexander and Afghan people.

• Bush's Fault

  Alexander had more troubles in Bactria than in any other part of his empire. Most people who have a reasonable knowledge about his life will recognize this. He couldn't soulve his problems there with a single battle or siege, so he had a series of skirmishes, ambushes to finaly "pacify" the country.
  
  But the author's necessity to present his case against George Bush is so strong that he deliberately paints the war as hopeless from the beginning. But the truth that anyone can grasp from the book is that: Alexander remained in Bactria for just one year, and that was enough. An army of greek veterans (actually, soldiers old enough to be relieved from the main army) which represented only a small fraction of the macedonian army was able not only to control the country for 200 years, but to spend most of this time fighting against each other since other threats were not present.
  
  

• A Great Title!

  For those who enjoy popular history, "Into the Land of Bones" presents a good fast-paced read. Certainly, the author's thesis that the military protagonists of the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries--the British, the Russians, and the United States--have not learned the lessons of history that Afghanistan [Alexander's Bactria and the Hindu Khush] ought to have taught them is undeniable. And Alexander's exploits are always compelling, especially the accounts of his deteriorating relations with his army in the unforgiving land that is today's Afghanistan.
  
  Unfortunately, however, this is Alexander-Lite. Other than his primary thesis on the Afghan quagmire, if one might use the term, the author does not delve deeply into the issues. Relying on tendentious evidence, he presumes to enter the mind, for instance, of Roxane, who "may have wished to remain anonymous married quietly to a local villager" [91]. Mercifully, he does not probe the psyche of Thalestris, Queen of the Amazons, who wanted to have Alexander's baby! It is difficult to take such speculations seriously.
  
  On a more serious note, the author omits any discussion of the major problem confronting scholars when evaluating the evidence for Alexander the Great: that the primary sources, which he does cite, are actually secondary sources, who are relying on lost eye-witness accounts, many of which had their own agendas. The author's splendid title, which immediately grabs the reader's attention, presents an example. In his recurring discussion of the "devouring dogs" that gnaw the bones of the dead and the dying at Zariaspa (Bactra), he cites the 1st-century geographer, Strabo (11.11.3), and two secondary sources. He neglects to inform us, however, that Strabo cites Onesicritus of Astypalaia as the source of this gruesome tale. Although Onesicritus constitutes an eye-witness of sorts, he is ridiculed by the ancient sources, including Arrian, as being both fanciful and mendacious. Alexander himself, according to Plutarch, threw Onesicritus' tales into the Indus River and told their author that he ought to jump in after them for writing such trash. And that is my biggest criticism of this book; that the author is extremely selective in his citations. So although I would not recommend the book as a reading for a serious course on Alexander the Great, I would recommend it as an entertaining book for the general public who doesn't care a whit about the picky-picky nature of scholarship.
  
  After all, no matter what any of us think, Alexander will remain Great. Otherwise we wouldn't keep reading about him.

• Counterinsurgency in the Ancient World

  An excellent addition to the literature on counterinsurgency and on Alexander the Great. Dr. Holt uses his extensive knowledge of Alexander to tell a cautionary tale about the long history of Afghanistan as a land of insurgency. He does this by telling the story of the insurgency there against Alexander which will be repeated several times in later periods with particular emphasis on the two nineteenth century British experiences, and the 20th century Russian experience, with an eye towards lessons for the 21st century American involvement. It is quite successful in presenting a cautionary tale about counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. He also does an excellent job of contrasting the first half of Alexander's military campaign outside of Greece which had a very conventional, albeit supremely successful, beginning with a sharp turn to unconventional after the death of Darius forced Alexander to enter Afghanistan to battle a warlord who also claimed the throne lost by Darius.
  
  The book succeeds both as a cautionary tale and as a straightforward account of the much lesser known foray into Bactria (modern day Afghanistan.)

• Argument from history is always dangerous and dubious

  Professor Holt has written a superb book about Alexander the Great's sojourn in what we now call Afghanistan. It is unlikely that he would have written this incisive and careful gem if we had not been attacked by fanatical murderers who were based there. We were attacked, brilliantly and successfully, and we have yet to bring to justice those who plotted this attack. In short, we are still not winning this war we have declared. But Professor Holt is not writing about this directly. What he has done is describe Alexander's attempts to pacify the region in preparation for his assault on what we now know as Pakistan and India.
  
  Alexander was the model of all conquerors after him, not only because he was remarkably successful but because he was audacious and brilliant, as well as remarkably brave and vicious, even by contemporary standards. As Holt shows, Alexander never did pacify the tribes of this region, in part because the geography of mountain valleys, desert and vast open grasslands were a nursery for tribalism. Holt leaves it to the reader to draw conclusions about our sojourn in Afghanistan. He does not compare our policy with Alexander's. How could he since we do not have a real policy. Half of Pakistan could as easily be in Afghanistan, Pashtuns living on both sides of the border.
  What Holt does show us with economy and brilliance, that despite the passage of two millenia, dramatic changes in religion and technology, there remains a profound commitment to feud, tribal loyalty, warrior culture and the oppression of women that no democratic country such as we claim to be can bring to heel without destroying our values and self-respect.